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present. In the absence of a writing, property should be found to have
been transmuted very infrequently. The result in Daniels is not disturbing because only the ownership of cash was involved and the court obviously believed the wife had a right to her contributions. Unfortunately,
the legal reasoning used to achieve that result may have created bad
precedent. Continued misuse of the principle of transmutation might result in separate property other than cash being taken from its rightful
owner. Consideration should be given to established gift and contract
law in transmutation cases like Daniels.
CRAIG A. SMITH

SECURITIES REGULATION-

INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
AND THE COMMON
ENTERPRISE REQUIREMENT
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. I
Plaintiff Hirk was induced to enter into a trading agreement with

Agri-Research Council, Inc., a company engaged in the management of
discretionary commodity futures accounts. 2 Pursuant to this agreement,
1. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. In contrast to a stock market investor, a commodities futures investor
does not actually purchase or sell commodities; he merely trades in commodity
futures contracts. A futures contract obligates its holder to buy or sell a certain
quantity of a specific commodity at a future date for a fixed price. These contracts are traded on futures exchanges via futures brokers or advisors. The
purchaser of a commodity futures contract makes his profit by attempting to
predict the rise or fall of commodity prices. To illustrate, assume that an investor
purchases a futures contract which entitles him to buy a certain commodity at a
fixed price. If before the delivery date of the contract the price of this specific
commodity rises, the investor can reap a profit in one of two ways. He may take
actual delivery of the commodity and sell it over the market at its now higher
price, or, as is more likely, he may merely sell his futures contract over the
exchange to another investor. On the other hand, if the investor purchases a
futures contract to sell, he is gambling that the price of the underlying commodity will go down. If this occurs, the other party to the contract is obligated to take
delivery of the commodity for the previously agreed-upon price even though the
commodity is being sold more cheaply on the open market. Of course, the purchasing party may avoid taking delivery of the commodity by making an offsetting transaction (i.e., by purchasing a contract to sell) before the delivery date.
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Hirk deposited $10,000 in an account with the defendant and executed
a power of attorney authorizing the company's vice-president to trade
for his account. The trading agreement stipulated that the company was
entitled to twenty-five per cent of the monthly profits accrued in the
account as compensation for its management services. Using the $10,000
for margin deposits,3 the defendant effected numerous transactions in
Hirk's account and losses of nearly $28,000 allegedly resulted. Hirk subsequently initiated suit, claiming that he was fraudulently induced into
opening the account with the defendant. He further contended that the
discretionary trading agreement was in essence a security 4 and that the
defendant's failure to register the agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission violated section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.1'
The district court- dismissed Hirk's complaint and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed,6 holding that without a showing of a pooling of funds by mul-

See generally Smith, Commodity Futures Trading, 25 DRAxE L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1975);
Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity
Futures Trading Act of 1974, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 710, 711-12 (1975).
In the typical futures trading account situation the individual investor determines which futures contracts he will buy or sell. However, in the discretionary
account situation the investor authorizes his broker to make all decisions concerning which contracts to trade in.
3. A margin deposit is the amount of money which a commodity broker is
required to deposit with the futures exchange in order to guarantee that his
customer will fulfill his obligations under the futures contract. See Smith, supra
note 2, at 13-14.
4. A security is defined in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 as "any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, ... investment contract
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'.
... " 15 U.S.C: § 77b(l) (1970). Hirk's complaint alleged that the discretionary
account constituted a security on the ground that it was either a "certificate of
interest or participation in [a] profit-sharing agreement" or an "investment contract." However, as the court correctly pointed out, most courts have made no
real distinction between these two types of securities. 561 F.2d at 102. As a practical matter, the terms are used interchangably and treated as possessing identical
elements. See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 138 (1971).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). A prima facie violation of § 5 is established by
showing that a registration statement was not in effect at the time securities were
offered or sold to the public through use of the mails or the facilities of interstate transportation. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448
F.2d 680, 686 (5th Cir. 1971); Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C. H. Wagner & Co.,
405 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (D. Mass. 1975).
6. Hirk's complaint charged in the alternative that the defendant had violated § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970), which
prohibits any fraudulent or deceptive practices or attempts to defraud or deceive
"in or in connection with" commodity futures transactions. The appellate court
reversed the lower court's dismissal of this portion of Hirk's complaint and held
that he had stated a valid cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act.
561 F.2d at 103-04. In this respect, the Hirk opinion is in line with the decisions
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tiple investors the "common enterprise" requirement for an investment
contract security was not satisfied.'
Although it is generally accepted that commodity futures contracts
themselves are not securities 8 and thus need not be registered under the
federal securities laws, 9 two distinct lines of authority have emerged as
to whether a discretionary trading account in commodities futures constitutes an investment contract and hence a security.' 0 The split among
the cases primarily has resulted from a disagreement over what meaning
to attribute to the words "common enterprise" which appear in the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract in SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co." This note will analyze the differing interpretations of common enterprise and then attempt to draw a conclusion as to which interpretation is more consonant with the purposes of the securities laws.
The basic test for an investment contract under the federal securities
laws ' 2 was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Howey. In
of other courts which have held that a private right of action exists for violations
of § 4b even though there is no express statutory provision granting a private
right for damages. See Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133
(8th Cir. 1970) (similar right under § 6d); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I.
duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968); Goodman v. H. Hentz &
Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
7. 561 F.2d at 101.
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l. Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 632 (9th
Cir. 1977); E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E. D. Mich.
1976); Golding v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 F. Supp.
1182, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669,
671 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995, 998-99 (S.D.
Iowa 1972).
9. Transactions in commodity futures contracts are, however, subject to
regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17
(1970).
10. The courts generally agree that a nondiscretionary trading account (i.e.,
one in which the investor determines which futures contracts to buy and sell) is
not an investment contract. See, e.g., E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder, 413 F.
Supp. 852, 860 (D.D.C. 1976); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669,
671 (C.D. Cal. 1973); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341
(E.D. La. 1972), affd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973). At least one court, however,
had held that even if there is no formal agreement designating the plaintiff's
commodities account as discretionary, an investment contract nonetheless exists if
the defendant has such control over the account that profits, if any, will result
from his efforts alone. Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341
F. Supp. 764, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
11. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
12. The Howey definition of an investment contract also has been adopted by
numerous state courts. See, e.g., Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala.
679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854,
171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); State v. Hodge, 204 Kan. 98, 460 P.2d 596 (1969); Garbo
v. Hilleary Franchise Systems, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972). A number of state courts, however, have rejected the Howey formula in
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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that case small parcels of land in citrus groves were sold to members of
the public. Contemporaneously with the sale, the purchasers were offered an opportunity to enter into a service agreement with a subsidiary
of the vendor. This agreement vested in the service company complete
control over the purchaser's acreage and "full discretion and authority
over the cultivation of the groves and the harvest and marketing of the
crops."'1 3 Upon considering the circumstances surrounding the entire
transaction, the Court held that this arrangement was an investment
contract under the following test:
The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial
whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or
whether
there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic
14
value.
Although the Supreme Court has reiterated its support for the Howev
test on several occasions,15 it has done little to clarify the scope or the
meaning of the test. As a result, the lower federal courts have reached
conflicting conclusions as to the meaning of certain segments of the test.
The words "common enterprise" have given the courts special difficulty.' 6 A number of courts have held that a common enterprise is a
favor of the "risk capital" test. Under the "risk capital" test the critical inquiry is
whether the investor's money is subjected to the risks of an enterprise over which
he has no managerial control. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55
Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center,
Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971). See also Coffey, The
Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a more Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAs. W.L.
REv. 367 (1967).
13. 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
14. Id. at 301.
15. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967).
16. The courts also have been troubled by the terms "investment of money"
and "profits to come solely from the efforts of others." As to the former phrase,
there is a general consensus that the investment need not actually be in cash; it is
sufficient if the investor contributes something of monetary value. Hannan &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 236 (1974); Long, supra note 4, at 161. However, the
courts have been unable to agree upon the interpretation to be given the words
"solely from the efforts of others." Some courts have literally construed the word
"solely" sd as to preclude the finding of an investment contract if the investor
participates in the management or control of the enterprise. Gallion v. Alabama
Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers,
Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969). Other courts have rejected
this literal interpretation and have held that this element of the Howey test is
satisfied if "the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or
success of the enterprise." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Accord, SEC v. Koscot Inhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/11
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relationship between multiple investors in which their monies or investment funds are pooled in an enterprise controlled by the promoter or a
third party. These courts maintain that a pooling of funds or a pro rata
sharing of the profits of the venture is a prerequisite to the existence of
a common enterprise as that term was used in Howey. 1 7 This view is
sometimes called the "horizontal" approach, i.e., the commonality required is among investors similarly situated. 18 Several other courts,
however, have construed common enterprise to mean an interrelationship between the investor and the promoter whereby the investor provides the capital for a mutual venture controlled by the promoter.
Under this "vertical" approach, the commonality requirement is satisfied
whenever the investor's financial interests are "inextricably tied" to the
efforts of the promoter.t 9 Although the vertical approach probably has
been more widely accepted,20 the horizontal approach also has a substantial following 21 and reflects the position adopted in Hirk.
In Hirk the court principally relied on their previous decision in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,2 2 which held that both multiple investors
and a pooling of funds or sharing of profits were required in order to
have a common enterprise. In Milnarik, which involved essentially the
same fact situation as presented in Hirk, the court ruled that a
discretionary commodities trading account was not a security on the

terplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Jenson v. Continental Financial Corp., 404 F. Supp. 792, 804-05 (D. Minn. 1975).
17. See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Glazer v. National Commodity Research and Statistical Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 547 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.
1977); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill: 1974); Stuckey v.
duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago
Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd without opinion, 491 F.2d
752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974).
18. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423
F. Supp. 168, 178 (D. Utah 1975). See also Hannan & Thomas, supra note 16, at
236-37.
19. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also Hannan & Thomas, supra note 16, at 236-37.
20. See, e.g., Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 821 (1973); Continental
Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905
(1968); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Jones v. International Inventors Inc. East, 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168 (D.
Utah 1975); Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C. H. Wagner & Co., 405 F. Supp. 385
(D. Mass. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
21. See cases cited note 17 supra.
22. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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ground that the discretionary arrangement merely created an agencyfor-hire relationship.2 3 Although the defendant managed discretionary
accounts for a number of investors, the court found that its relationship
with each investor was that of agent and principal because each account
was unitary in nature and the success or failure of one account had no
24
direct impact on the others.
Despite the fact that Milnarik did not directly address the pooling
issue, the Hirk court stated that it was apparent that Milnarik was based
on the assumption that there must be a pooling or sharing of funds in
order for a common enterprise to exist. 25 The court then went on to
hold that a showing of ostensible pooling did not meet the commonality
requirement; there must be an actual pooling of investments. The court
reached this result in response to the plaintiff's allegation that his
monies and those of other investors were treated as if commingled because the defendant made substantially similar transactions in all the accounts, and profits and losses for all accounts flowed at a uniform
rate. 26 The court ruled, however, that this was insufficient to fulfill the
pooling requirement because it did not overcome the fact that the accounts were segregated and that each had a success or failure rate independent of the others.
Hirk's emphasis on a pooling of investments and a sharing of profits
appears to be misplaced in light of the facts of the Howey case. Although
in Howey the investors' funds apparently were commingled by the defendant, the Supreme Court did not indicate that this was a determinative
factor in its decision. Instead, the Court stressed the extent of the defendant's control over the enterprise 27 and the fact that the investors'
returns on their investments hinged upon the effectiveness of the defendant's management of the enterprise. 28 Furthermore, although Hirk
and other cases which purport to follow Howey have stated that a pro
rata sharing of profits among investors is critical to a finding of a common enterprise, 29 an examination of Howey clearly shows that no sharing
23. Id. at 277.
24. Id. at 276-77. The court further stated that even though the various
customers were represented by a common agent, "they were not joint participants in the same investment enterprise." Id.
25. 561 F.2d at 101.
26. Id.
27. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. In addition, the Court noted
that investors could neither market the harvest from their land nor pick specific
fruit without first obtaining the service company's consent. 328 U.S. at 296.
28. The Court found that the investors were "predominantly business and
professional people who lack[ed] the knowledge, skill and equipment necessary
for the care and cultivation of citrus trees." 328 U.S. at 296. "A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and
equipment [was] therefore essential if the investors [were] to achieve their
paramount aim of a return on their investments." Id. at 300.
29. See cases cited note 17 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/11
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of profits occurred in that case. Each investor's profit depended solely
upon the amount of fruit harvested from his individual and identified
plot. 30

Other courts confronted with the question whether a discretionary
commodities trading account possesses the commonality necessary to
qualify as an investment contract have reached conclusions contrary to
32
that reached in Hirk.31 In SEC v. Continental Commodities Corporation
the district court relied on Milnarik in ruling that such an arrangement
was not a common enterprise because the accounts of the individual investors were unrelated and there was no proportionate sharing in a
mutual fund composed of the investors' profits. The Fifth Circuit reversed and expressly rejected both the pooling concept and the Milnarik
view. 3 3 The court criticized "the elevation of a pooling ingredient to
exalted status in inquiries concerning a common enterprise," 34 and repudiated the notion that commonality requires a pro rata sharing of
profits among investors. The court stated that the more significant factor
was whether the success of the enterprise as a whole and the contributor's investment individually were contingent upon the expertise of
35
those seeking the investment.

30. The Court did state that all the elements of a profit-seeking venture were
present in Howey because "[t]he investors provide the capital and share in the
earnings and profits [while] the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise.' 328 U.S. at 300. However, this contradicts the Court's previous finding
that each investor's net profit was based on the amount of fruit harvested from
his individual tract of land. Id. at 296. Moreover, although the fruit from all the
citrus groves was pooled for marketing purposes, the lower court specifically
found
that each purchaser looked for the income from his investment to the
fruitage of his own grove and not to the fruitage of the groves as a
whole. It is quite clear, too, that each purchaser's income was in no
sense dependent upon the purchase or development of other tracts
than his own except in the sense that as grove owners generally prospered, each owner of a grove would.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293
(1946).
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Rochkind v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975); Marshall v. Lamson
Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Berman v. Orimex Trading,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp.
423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

32. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 521.
34. Id. at 522.

35. Id. at 523-24. The court also pointed out that because the investors
lacked the business acumen possessed by the promoters, they were forced to
"inexorably rely on Continental Commodities' guidance for the success of their
investment." Id. at 522.
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This view-that a common enterprise exists whenever the fortunes of
the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and
success of the promoter-not only has gained wide acceptance, 30 but is
also more consistent with both the remedial purposes of the securities
laws 37 and Howey 3s than is the Hirk-Milnarik approach. In addition, the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Tcherepnin v. Knight3 9 and United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 40 further support the vertical approach to the definition of common enterprise.
In the Knight case the Court held that withdrawable capital shares in a
state savings and loan association were investment contracts. 41 The
Court found that the plaintiffs were participants in a common enterprise
because the success of the operation and the plaintiffs' profits depended
upon the skill and efforts of the association's management. Moreover,
the rate of return on the plaintiffs' investments was "tied directly to the
amount of profits City Savings [made] from year to year. Clearly, then,
[these] shares have the essential attributes of investment contracts as that
term ... was defined in Howey. ' ' 42 In Forman the Court emphasized
that even though an interest offered to the public might be labled a
"stock," it did not necessarily follow that this interest was a security
within the meaning of the federal securities laws. The distinguishing
feature of a security transaction is "an investment whereby one parts
with his money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of
43
others."
These decisions suggest that contrary to the view expressed in Hirk,
the basic component of a common enterprise is not a pooling of funds
36. See cases cited note 20 supra.
37. It is well established that remedial legislation such as the federal securities laws "should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Further, in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), the Supreme Court stated that the term "security" was intended to encompass not only the obvious and commonplace, but
also "[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices ... if it be proved as matter of fact
that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing
which established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts'...."
38. In Howey the Court stated that its definition of an investment contract
embodied "a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits." 328 U.S. at 229.
39. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
40. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
41. The plaintiff's complaint had alleged that a withdrawable capital share
was a security as that term was defined in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Although the statutory definition of a
security under the 1934 Act differs slightly from the definition of a security
under the 1933 Act, the Supreme Court held that for present purposes the
coverage of the two Acts was virtually identical. 389 U.S. at 335-36.
42. Id. at 339.
43. 421 U.S. at 858.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/11
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by multiple investors, but rather the dependency of the investor's fortunes upon the ability of the promoter or of a third party to make the
undertaking a success. 44 Therefore, there is no apparent reason why a
common enterprise cannot exist between a single investor and a single
promoter. Indeed, this conclusion was reached in Jones v. International
Inventors Incorporated East.45

In Jones the plaintiff responded to an ad-

vertisement in which the defendant offered to evaluate the feasibility of
inventions for $250. The defendant advised the plairitiff that if his invention received a positive evaluation, the defendant would undertake to
market the invention and share the profits with the plaintiff. When the
defendant refused to take any action after the agreement was entered
into, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that this transaction constituted
an investment contract. After first noting that the state of the law concerning what comprises a common enterprise was somewhat unsettled,
the court concluded that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to show a
pooling of funds or pro rata sharing of profits in order to maintain his
securities claim. 46 The court held that the commonality requirement
may be fulfilled by showing that the fate of the individual's investment
was dependent upon the effectiveness of the promoter's efforts. 47 That
burden had been satisfied because the plaintiff's success was obviously
tied to the success of the defendant's promotional and marketing efforts.

48

44. This same conclusion was intimated in Howey. See text accompanying
notes 27 & 28 supra.
45. 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Contra, Sunshine Kitchens v. Alanthus
Corp., 403 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
46. "It is not significant whether the profits of the enterprise will be pooled
and distributed among all the investors and the promoter, but rather the emphasis should be on 'the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts' on the
fate of all the investors." 429 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
47. It may be difficult to determine whether the relationship between two
individuals is that of investor and promoter or that of principal and agent. The
fundamental distinction is that the investor/promoter situation gives rise to a

common enterprise because the promoter makes those essential managerial decisions that determine the success or failure of their venture. On the other hand,
no common enterprise exists in a principal/agent relationship because "the fortunes of the investor, by virtue of his right to control his agent-the promoter-are dependent solely upon the investor's personal efforts." Newton, What is
a Security?: A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167, 177 (1977). It is this notion of
dependency that governs the finding vel non of a common enterprise. Factors
which tend to establish the requisite dependency include the personal expertise
of the person asked to finance the undertaking and his chances for profit should
he endeavor to make the venture a success on his own. If the investor has little
or no individual expertise in the subject matter of the investment and therefore

must rely heavily upon the promoter for the success of the enterprise, the conclusion is strong that a common enterprise exists. Id.
48. See also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
In that case the court stated that "the requisite commonality is evidenced by the
fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy" of the
promoter's efforts. Id. at 479.
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The rationale of the Hirk decision is further weakened by the fact that
although the court stubbornly defended the pooling concept, it did not
adequately explain why a pooling of funds by multiple investors is so
critical to the existence of a common enterprise. The court simply stated
that Milnarik had assumed that Howey required such a pooling and it was
unwilling to overrule that decision. 4 9 However,, as previously mentioned, Howey placed little, if any, emphasis on the pooling concept as
amplified in Milndrik.50 Even assuming that Hirk was correct in holding
that a common enterprise requires a pooling of funds, the court was not
justified in differentiating between actual pooling and ostensible pooling.5" While the accounts may have been technically distinct, if as a
practical matter they were managed as one large discretionary account
there was no basis for requiring the funds to be actually commingled.
Analytically, the impact on the investors' fortunes is the same whether
identical transactions are simultaneously effected in numerous separate
accounts or one transaction is effected in an account composed of the
contributions of multiple investors. Yet under the reasoning adopted by
the Hirk court, the former situation would not constitute an investment
52
contract, while the latter presumably would.
Finally, in mechanically sustaining the restrictive Milnarik test the court
ignored the economic factors that are essential to the proper identification of a security. If the court had undertaken to consider the economic
realities of a discretionary commodities trading account, it would have
realized that such an arrangement possesses all the inherent evils the
securities laws were intended to combat. 53 It is well established that the
49. 561 F.2d at 101.
50. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
51. "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to
be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
52. But see Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973), where
the court held that an investment contract did not exist even though the defendant controlled a discretionary trading account funded by multiple investors.
Relying on Milnarik, the court found that in essence the defendant was merely
managing a single unitary account which had been opened by joint investors. Id.
at 63-64.
53. Congress enacted the federal securities provisions to remedy the
practices and abuses which precipitated the stock market crash of'
October 1929. To correct these abuses, Congress sought to implement a two-fold policy. Initially, an attempt was made to place investors on an equal footing with respect to investments decisions
through full and fair disclosure of all relevant information concerning the future of the issuer and the value of the offered security ....
Also, Congress attempted to prevent further exploitation of the public by misrepresentation through the sale of unsound,
fraudulant and worthless securities. To fully implement these policies,
the federal courts have placed substance over form to analyze the
economic realities underying a given transaction. In doing so, the term
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/11
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particular form a transaction takes is not nearly as important as "the
5 4
determination of who, in reality, bears the principal risk of loss."

Where a scheme such as that presented in Hirk exists, there can be no
doubt that the person who provides the capital for the account bears this
risk. Consequently, the courts should not be reluctant to find that this
type of arrangement is encompassed by the definition of a security and
that the individual persuaded into financing this enterprise is entitled to
the protection of the securities laws.
LLOYD

J.

BANDY, JR.

"security" has been expanded beyond its traditional definition. (footnotes omitted)
Newton, supra note 47, at 168-69.
54. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 16, at 242. See generally, Coffey, supra note
12, at 375 (risk to initial investment is the single most important economic
characteristic which distinguishes a security from the universe of other transactions); Long, Commodity Options-Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 75, 87 (1975) (particular form of transaction is virtually irrelevant; test for "securitiness" based on
economic substance of transaction). See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967), where the Supreme Court stated that "in searching for the meaning
and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be disregarded for
substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality."
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